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ICYMI: Emotet Reappeared Early This Year, Unfortunately
By Adithya Chandra and Joao Marques · September 1, 2023
This blog was also written by Raghav Kapoor
Executive Summary
Emotet first appeared in 2014 and continues to be a dangerous and resilient malware, despite attempts by law enforcement agencies to take it down in early 2021. Even following a major takedown effort from Europol, Emotet has been relentless over time and earlier this year it was back with epoch 4 and epoch 5 versions leveraging macros and embedded scripts in Microsoft Word and Microsoft OneNote, respectively.
Since their return last year, Trellix has continued to monitor Emotet to identify new infection vectors and changes in their activities and methodology. In this blog, we will highlight its Global Prevalence, Infection Vectors, new TTPs and discuss detection opportunities to help keep organizations safe from this malware. We will also cover how Trellix Products offer protection against these TTPs.
Introduction
Emotet (also known as Geodo and Heodo) is a well-known Banking Trojan, but also functions as a downloader/ dropper of other malware. In January 2021, Emotet infrastructure was taken down – but returned by November that year and increasing its operations in 2022 and early 2023. Emotet continues to be a dangerous and resilient malware due to fact that the Emotet Threat Actors leverage several distinct infection chains (Malicious Macros/VBS/WSF, ZipBombing, LNK files, HTA files) over a short course of time.
When Emotet resumed operations in the month of March 2023 after a small hiatus, the initial infection vector was a heavily padded Microsoft Word document with a macro. Soon thereafter, following a policy enforced by Microsoft, they moved from Word documents to OneNote sections. In the latest versions of Emotet payloads, we have observed significant changes in its TTPs, including new delivery vectors to evade detection mechanisms.
Emotet - Global Prevalence
Figure 1 shows the Global Prevalence for the Emotet Malware that has been continuously tracked by Trellix's Threat Intelligence Group (TIG).
From the intelligence data gathered by TIG, Top 10 impacted countries include Estonia, Thailand, Guatemala, Israel, Singapore, Turkey, Italy, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine and Portugal. The top 5 industry sectors that are targeted include E-Commerce, Energy/ Utilities, Financial Services, Government, HealthCare.
Infection Vector: Email
The major infection vector is malicious email campaigns and thread hijacked emails, with multiple variants. Emotet frequently uses traditional phishing methods like thread hijacking techniques as part of its attack flow. This technique generates fake replies based on legitimate emails stolen from mail clients of Windows hosts previously infected with Emotet. The botnet uses this stolen email data to create fake replies impersonating the original senders.
In the next sections, we discuss the prevalent variants across victims including “zip bombing”, OneNote attachments, and encrypted attachments.
Variant 1: Invoice Themed Emails
Instead of using a hijacked email, this time the attacker added reply format (‘RE:’) in the Subject field and included a malicious ZIP file as an attachment. We have seen various invoice themed emails spreading Emotet.
The ZIP file contains a Word document which is larger than 500MB. Documents are padded with 00 byte to increase the file size and make it harder for antivirus solutions to scan and detect malware.
Variant 2: Using OneNote as a Dropper
This variant uses the same email structure as the invoice themed emails. As Microsoft is blocking macros by default, attackers have started using OneNote. OneNote documents have an embedded VBScript/JavaScript which gets the payload.
Variant 3: Encrypted Malicious Attachment
This variant of attack features a password protected attachment. We have seen both password protected ZIP files and OneNote documents. This is usually done to evade AV detection and bypass file scanning detection.
Our team extracted and downloaded the final payloads from various such examples. We then transferred them over to a sandbox environment, where we could execute the payload safely to detect and examine its maliciousness based on dynamic analysis.
MITRE Mappings
In this section we have mapped each phase of the attack flow to its MITRE technique. This helps to understand how the attack progresses.
Attack Behavior
Example
MITRE ATT&CK
Malicious email with attachment.
A threat actor lured a user to open an email with a malicious zip attachment.
User executes the malicious document, allowing the macros/ embedded Scripts to run.
User Opens the Word/OneNote doc and clicks on enable content/ allowing it to run the scripts.
Weaponized macro with VB/JS scripts that trigger further executions from the document.
Word reaches out to C2 servers/ spawns regsvr32 binary as per the embedded script.
Obfuscate commands executed from payloads, used to evade signature-based detections and application control mechanisms.
Threat actors have obfuscated the embedded scripts, which gets de-obfuscated at runtime.
Application connects with attacker-controlled servers and downloads further payloads as needed.
Word document/OneNote file connects with external servers to download Emotet malware payloads and loaders.
Application leverages Windows binary Regsvr32 for the proxy execution of malicious code.
The document spawns regsvr32 to execute the DLL’s downloaded.
Malware modules add an entry to “run keys” in the Registry/Startup folder.
Regsvr32 binary creates persistence on the machine by adding Registry Run Keys, which will execute the loader DLL when a user logs in.
Malware module executes discovery commands for enumeration
Regsvr32 executes system discovery commands for enumeration via ipconfig.exe and systeminfo.exe.
Threat actors inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses.
Regsvr32 injects code into a copy of certutil.exe.
Threat actors acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser with the help of tools.
Injected CertUtil uses NirSoft modules (e.g.: WebBrowserPassView) to retrieve browser credentials.
Threat actor employs asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic.
The malware fingerprints the infected machine and sends the collected info to C2. This data transmitted is encrypted via ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) algorithm.
Threat actors exfiltrate the data over an existing command and control channel to attacker-controlled servers.
Regsvr32.exe binary starts network connections with multiple command and control servers hardcoded in the core module.
Dissecting Emotet
In the next few sections, we will explain each of Emotet’s TTPs and attack vectors in detail. When Emotet spam activity began in March 2023, it started delivering malicious documents embedded in Zip files, sent as email attachments. The documents employ social engineering techniques to trick users into enabling the macros. Initial distribution was seen through Word documents with malicious macros.
These Word documents were heavily padded to help evade detection from security products. This binary padding technique is used by Emotet to inflate file sizes so that they exceed the size limitations imposed by anti-malware solutions such as sandboxes and scan engines.
Eventually, the threat actors behind Emotet malware switched from Word documents with macros to OneNote files with embedded scripts. This is likely because Microsoft’s new policy disabled the execution of Office Macros in documents that were downloaded from the Internet.
Figure 5 shows the templates used by the attacker in Word and OneNote files to entice the user to enable the macro content.
As seen in the Figure 6, the Word document consists of a macro that the user must give explicit approval to run by clicking ‘Enable Content’. Similarly in OneNote sections, the user must give explicit approval when it warns about attachments being opened. Thus, each of these vectors involves user interaction to make the attack run, thereby limiting its effectiveness.
Attack Flow
Figure 7 shows how the recent Emotet Malware attack proceeds as it traverses across its kill chain.
Phishing: Spear Phishing Attachment (T1566.001)
As seen in the ‘Infection Vector’ section above, the most prevalent technique of infection is through emails. In early March 2023, Emotet malicious spam campaigns spiked, which leveraged the email thread hijacking technique. This technique uses legitimate messages stolen from infected computers' email clients. There have been multiple variants based on the email template discussed in that section.
User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002)
The user downloads the Zip file that is received from the email, extracts the Word/OneNote document, and executes it. As shown in Figures 5 and 6, the template tries to lure the user into enabling macros The Word documents in this campaign contained malicious VBA macros that, when executed, functioned as an Emotet downloader, retrieving the Emotet payloads from attacker-controlled distribution servers and infecting systems, thus adding them to the Emotet.
In the following sections, we will discuss each of the attack payloads: Word Document Payload and OneNote Document Payload.
Word Document Payload
When the Emotet activities began in March 2023, all initial payloads targeted Microsoft Office documents. The dropper document uses the null (0x00) byte padding technique to inflate the file size. The macro is also heavily obfuscated, and when executed fetches the Emotet DLL hosted on external attacker-controlled servers.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic (T1059.005)
Threat actors behind Emotet embedded a VBScript within this malicious Word document, which is executed upon opening the document and enabling content as shown in Figure 5.
Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)
The macro can be visualized by enabling Developer Mode. The macro inside is completely obfuscated/encrypted as shown in Figure 8 . Emotet’s downloaders that are based on Microsoft Word format use VBA AutoOpen macros to execute the code that downloads the Emotet loader DLL.
Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)
On analyzing the functions which decrypt and print the output with a debugger, we can decrypt this macro as shown in Figure 9. We can see that the Word document reaches out to external IPs and downloads additional DLLs, which in turn are executed via regsvr32. The files created /dropped are named with ‘infected’ time.
Figure 10 shows the files created/unzipped from winword.exe with the help of macros. Note the use of infected time in the filenames.
System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 (T1218.010)
Microsoft Word documents can spawn Regsvr32 and execute the dropped a ‘.tmp’ file, which is a DLL file. Soon after execution, it copies itself into the ‘AppData\Local’ folder and a new regsvr32 binary is spawned, which executes this copied DLL.
The copied DLL is created from the core Emotet DLL, with internal name “E.dll”
This core DLL drops the cloned DLL to the AppData/Local directory and executes it with the regsvr32 binary.
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
The regsvr32 binary then creates persistence by adding an entry to the "run keys" in the registry as shown in Figure 14:
System Information Discovery (T1082)
The regsvr32 binary also spawns the systeminfo.exe binary, and uses the system native ‘systeminfo’ command to retrieve all details about the infected Windows system.
System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016)
The regsvr32 also spawns ipconfig.exe binary and uses system native ipconfig /all command to gather details of infected host’s network adapters.
Process Injection: Process Hollowing (T1055.012)
The Emotet module uses a copy of certutil.exe to inject its code. Figure 17 shows the dropping of certutil.exe in the Temp folder and accessing it with granted access code: 0x1FFFFF. CertUtil.exe is renamed with a random string and dropped. Along with copies of the CertUtil binary, a ‘.tmp’ files are also dropped, which is used to save the information collected. Each time the process is run, it is accompanied with the ‘.tmp’ file.
Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003)
Emotet uses modules from NirSoft for subsequent artifacts which are injected into CertUtil. NirSoft provides freeware utilities for password recovery. This is not the first time we have noticed the use of NirSoft tools by Emotet for credential access. Figure 18 shows the usage of the NirSoft binary command run via CertUtil.exe and the process tampering event.
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002)
The new Emotet modules also uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for asymmetric encryption, leveraging an onboard elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH-ECK1) public key for encryption and an onboard elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA-ECS1) public key for data/server response validation. These encryption keys are used to identify the Emotet botnets. This time Emotet has epoch Version 4 and epoch Version 5.
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) / Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)
Once the core DLL executes and successfully infects the victim, it reaches out to its C2. It then pings each of the IPs from its hardcoded C2 list. In Figure 20, it shows the connection made with an external IP by the regsvr32 binary and usage of the ‘WinHttpSendRequest’ in WINHTTP.dll for the network traffic.
Many C2 IPs are hardcoded in the core module.
Emotet Payload Downloads
Figure 22 shows the download activity of the Emotet loader DLL from an external server via HTTP ‘GET’ request with the useragent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;Win32;WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5).
Emotet Certificate
Emotet uses self-signed SSL connections to Emotet’s infrastructure. Typical Emotet SSL certificates is shown in Figure 23:
OneNote Document Payload
While initial Emotet operations used Microsoft Word, later they shifted focus to OneNote files. This is likely due to policy enforcement from Microsoft, which resulted in various threat actors moving away from macro-based exploits. There were multiple variants of payloads used by Emotet in OneNote exploits. Some of which are discussed below:
User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002)
WSF/VBS Payloads:
The threat actors leveraged Windows Script File (WSF), which is scripted to retrieve and execute the Emotet binary payload from a remote server. The script file is inserted in the “view” button within the OneNote document as shown below.
When the user clicks the “View” button on a OneNote page section, it triggers a hidden action that drops and executes a .wsf file (Windows Script File) called “click.wsf” using “wscript.exe”.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic (T1059.005)
Threat actors leveraged VBScript in the WSF file to download and execute the loader DLL.
Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)
The contents in the Dropped WSF file are obfuscated. The below Image shows the obfuscated content and the decrypted version.
Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)
The above WSF file contents (which are obfuscated) can be easily de-obfuscated by replacing the ‘Execute’ command with the ‘Echo’ command, so that wscript prints the output instead of executing it, as shown in Figure 26. The de-obfuscated content shows the hardcoded URLs by which Emotet payloads are downloaded by wscript.exe.
When running the WSF script, wscript.exe contacts the external URLs and downloads the Emotet payloads.
System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 (T1218.010)
Upon dropping the DLLs, wscript.exe spawns the regsvr32.exe binary to execute the dropped DLLs, as shown in Figure 28:
After the execution of regsvr32, the rest of the attack patterns are similar to those using Microsoft Word.
JS Payload:
Another Emotet variant embedded the object inside of the OneNote files as JavaScript instead of VBScript. Everything else remains the same, with the only change being to its initial infection script.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007)
In this case, the threat actors leveraged embedded JavaScript to download and execute the loader DLL. This is further explained below.
Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)
The contents in the dropped JS file are obfuscated. Figure 30 shows the obfuscated content and Figure 31 shows the decrypted version.
Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)
This script is heavily obfuscated and can be de-obfuscated using any JavaScript de-obfuscating tool. The de-obfuscated content shows the hardcoded URLs by which Emotet payloads are downloaded using wscript.exe, and later executed by regsvr32.exe with the ‘/s’ flag as seen in Figure 31.
The rest of the execution phases are similar to the case with the Word document payload described in the “Word Document Payload” section. With the recent resurgence, Emotet has modified its TTPs several times in a very short span of time, to maximize the likelihood of evading detection and successfully infecting victims.
Conclusion
Emotet evolved multiple times over the years since 2014 and has been a prolific and resilient threat, even surviving a takedown of its infrastructure in 2021. The rise and fall of Emotet serve as a stark reminder of the ever-evolving nature of cyber threats and the need for a united front to combat them effectively. Throughout this blog, we have delved into the initial infection vector, modus operandi and impacts of its infection.
Threat actors are constantly evolving their tactics and techniques to maximize the likelihood of successfully infecting victims. In today’s dynamic threat landscape, educating users or employees about the risks of opening untrusted files, can help prevent them from falling victim to this type of malware infection. By staying informed, fostering the culture of cybersecurity awareness and forging strong partnerships, both individual users and organisations can greatly reduce the risk of getting infected.
Detection Opportunities
At Trellix, we are committed to protecting our customers from upcoming and emerging threats to their enterprise networks, including those found in the wild. Trellix SecOps builds advanced detection features, improving our Threat Detection capabilities. At Trellix, we have an in-house tracker that grabs the latest samples from both open and closed sources, enriching our information and driving our product innovation. This ensures that our clients are protected. The following sections highlight Trellix product coverage, Sigma coverage, Snort Rules and IOC’s.
Trellix Product Coverage
Trellix Cloud MVX
Trellix File Protect
Trellix Malware Analysis
Trellix SmartVision
Trellix Email Security
Trellix Detection as a Service
FEC_Downloader_Macro_Generic_57 (703560)
FE_Trojan_Macro_Generic_303_FEBeta (419536)
FE_Trojan_ZIP_Generic_11_FEBeta (419542)
---------------
Dynamic:
Suspicious Process Macro Regsvr32 Activity
Suspicious File Drop and Execute DLL
Suspicious Process Office Running DllLL
Suspicious Process REGSVR32 Activity
Potential ZipBomb
Suspicious Static Analysis One Doc and ZipBomb
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [AppData Local Path - DLL Load]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Suspicious Network Connection]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Suspicious System Discovery Commands]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Registry Run Key Modified]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Wscript - Suspicious Child Process]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution With Image Extension]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Stored Browser Credential Access]
WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution Path]
SIGMA Coverage
Rule 1:
title: Suspicious process spawned from Wscript
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious child processes of WScript
date: 2023/03/26
tags:
- defense_evasion
- t1059.005
- t1059.007
- t1218.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- \wscript.exe
Image|endswith:
- \regsvr32.exe
condition: selection
level: high
Rule 2:
title: Regsvr32 RunKey Modifications
status: experimental
description: Detects direct modification of AutoStart Extensibility Point (ASEP) in registry using Regsvr32
date: 2023/03/26
tags:
- persistence
- t1547.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- \software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
condition: all of selection_*
level: high
Rule 3:
title: CertUtil in Suspicious Location
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of CertUtil from a suspicious folder.
date: 2023/03/26
tags:
- defense_evasion
- t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \certutil.exe
filter:
- Image|startswith:
- C:\Windows\System32\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
- C:\Windows\WinSxS\
condition: selection and not filter
level: high
SNORT Rules:
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"Emotet SSL/TLS Certificate";flow:established, to_client; tls.cert_subject; content:"O=Global Security, OU=IT Department, CN=example.com"; classtype:trojan-activity; rev:1; metadata: created_at 2023_03_28;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Suspicious UserAgent in Outbound Traffic"; flow:to_server,established;fast_pattern:only; http_uri; content:"User-Agent|3A 20|Mozilla/4.0 (compatible|3B| Win32|3B|WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5)"; http_header; content:"GET"; http_method; service http; classtype:trojan-activity; rev:1; metadata: created_at 2023_03_28;)
IOCs
IP/ Ports
129.232.188.93|443
164.90.222.65|443
159.65.88.10|8080
172.105.226.75|8080
115.68.227.76|8080
187.63.160.88|80
169.57.156.166|8080
185.4.135.165|8080
153.126.146.25|7080
197.242.150.244|8080
139.59.126.41|443
186.194.240.217|443
103.132.242.26|8080
206.189.28.199|8080
163.44.196.120|8080
95.217.221.146|8080
159.89.202.34|443
119.59.103.152|8080
183.111.227.137|8080
201.94.166.162|443
103.75.201.2|443
149.56.131.28|8080
79.137.35.198|8080
5.135.159.50|443
66.228.32.31|7080
91.121.146.47|8080
153.92.5.27|8080
45.235.8.30|8080
72.15.201.15|8080
107.170.39.149|8080
45.176.232.124|443
82.223.21.224|8080
167.172.199.165|8080
213.239.212.5|443
202.129.205.3|8080
94.23.45.86|4143
147.139.166.154|8080
167.172.253.162|8080
91.207.28.33|8080
188.44.20.25|443
104.168.155.143|8080
110.232.117.186|8080
164.68.99.3|8080
1.234.2.232|8080
173.212.193.249|8080
182.162.143.56|443
160.16.142.56|8080
101.50.0.91|8080
103.43.75.120|443
203.26.41.132
101.99.3.20
91.207.181.106|443
103.159.224.46|8080
128.199.24.148|8080
165.22.211.113|8080
165.227.166.238|8080
167.172.248.70|8080
178.128.23.9|7080
178.128.31.80|443
178.128.82.218|443
190.90.233.69|443
213.32.75.32|8080
1.234.2.232:8888
187.63.16 0.88:80
147.139.166.154:8000
91.207.28.33:8000
5.135.159.50:443
153.92.5.27:8000
213.239.212.5:443
167.172.253.162:8888
153.126.146.25:7888
119.59.183.152:8888
183.111.227.137:8088
159.89.202.34:443
110.232.117.186:8080
129.232.188.93:443
172.105.226.75:8080
197.242.150.244:8080
66.228.32.31:7880
91.121.146.47:8888
45.176.232.124:443
160.16.14 2.56:8080
94.23.45.86:4143
182.162.143.56:443
82.223.21.224:8080
Domain / URLs
snaptikt.com
esentai-gourmet.kz
189dom.com
mtp.evotek.vn
midcoastsupplies.com.au
File Hashes: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276087353bb1816f2da27616169fd6ccc02111904fac86e1c1a98dfbf28410c7
81871761e94a0d0237f739ca3edb0c74859d0f526d06622bc0f3874304a36a99
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478e9b93cb18b9341463b2ef1a2f716f5fdb1cfe95415bae63b8b0dd58faa213
e0c953fd3b246dd2c23b4545508e8924870447d98a799ad7f9a1b7f79c99ce00
e2f009ca5f798e67ecff5de60b57d123fae09bb852c8f3300260caeb8ea3864f
ef83b4a7000b2d750d15cee1ff4f80e421b59be76535b56f8f2e209a233e5b22
5f093d22fb90f358a3b30e9b8ee1b354602d1138aa85be43e51b3e046f4bb74d
a7bb0dfac8598a140ffb6909c1c84424fbb1e540331e27b2f4b4278917bce154
158b8b9cfd21dbe5e445294a1969a524311c8ebcd390e561872b6ab2e7e48f81
bf8f2fd4617ae5f61bed155952fd2e5b072ae52b6b2f2e10f063aef67c54a853
ad17022657361744ddbafb5bc128adb422c0adea536b1d25638812ff4c09f54e
93b2278ca162e14b6913007e15f43779011e0f38cceeafd07621a21cfba0691a
b78056e71dcb3bfcf9b93e99d236a56a3ae8b365fedcb93a99ec713872bf9b7d
2a85d34f09898cfd4390fd4fdfd5e181a9ab8b76fdeb19e48c4121c642d713e5
8d4427329c8bde96652807caa270a0950be8f917076cb1c5bb893995c995a5ac
17eca4943b3040c47babe49d2d1f59f4852695e2348fe107ec935e38416e511b
01426cf98cc9c644f4a10d5613e0652960ff898c95deafb36db6eb2673f55cb5
06dae86292a7c4aa6c4c1daa6320a1613356dd8efb13143af6cc31f51085339a
ddceb4ff53a28163f6fa8997c5e4add3219a63e7281d2d4ac857f3d44f839797
fe4861a51211c399880a9378f70447421439efd2598abacf7b821e898c57ea65
2c5899c397f3ee4069618b6f864705f0f2d99132b62a3b4a4c0538e1f78f7bff
3f5e93f40e01e3193eae3e1dda93aa3b20c4683bdb6b50304f372e55f05e56ca
95312c538d7b0617cf859d06b4468d9fb468bad816249ec7586aca1df9df1e8a
bc495a04c0ab16a115b6ce3213966d1d7a0b7f265ae9f75d9206d21eb6cb4be7
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