Trellix Advanced Research Center

Operational Technology
Threat Report
November 2026

April 1 – September 30, 2026

Executive summary

Between April 1 and September 30, 2026, the most consequential operational technology (OT) development was a cluster of government-confirmed, direct control-system activity against the U.S. water and wastewater sector. Multiple official reporting streams—a CISA advisory on Iranian-affiliated programmable logic controller (PLC) targeting and its July update, Minnesota state reporting on more than 30 community water systems, and a July FBI/EPA warning on internet-facing PLCs—independently documented malicious interaction with PLCs and human-machine interfaces (HMIs).

These are separate reporting streams with different observation windows, affected equipment, and attribution; this report treats them as corroborating a pattern of water-sector PLC exposure, not a single campaign or an additive victim count.

Against that backdrop, Trellix telemetry offers a large, complementary view of the enterprise-IT threats reaching industrial-sector organizations. Across nine industrial-sector categories, it recorded 29.8M malicious-file detections in the period—about 1% of them campaign-associated (matches to threat-intelligence indicators)—concentrated in manufacturing (49.3%), industrial (13.0%), and energy/oil and gas (12.3%). The data reflects which industries generate detections, not which technologies were targeted.

Separately, the vulnerability exploitation we documented in-period centered on enterprise-facing appliances—VPNs, application-delivery controllers, and identity systems that industrial organizations also use for remote access and perimeter defense. These create real risk for industrial remote access and the IT/OT boundary, but the available evidence does not establish that any of these enterprise-appliance compromises progressed into an industrial control environment.

Industrial ransomware remained prominent by one measure only—the volume of leak-site extortion claims. Across five core industrial sectors, Trellix ransomware tracking recorded roughly 1.5K posts, up +50.8% quarter-over-quarter in posting volume.

Finally, the period included at least one documented destructive-OT incident: Incident-response firm Profero reported a dual IT/OT sabotage operation at an Israeli food-production plant in May 2026, including manipulation of refrigeration controllers and destroyed equipment. We present this as an important direct-OT case, attributed explicitly to Profero and uncorroborated by independent Trellix observation.

What defenders should take from this period

Internet-exposed PLCs and enterprise remote-access infrastructure remain critical points of exposure for industrial environments. Prioritize removing controllers from direct internet access, rapidly remediating actively exploited edge-appliance vulnerabilities, and strengthening segmentation and coordinated threat monitoring across IT and OT environments.

OT threat landscape overview

Enterprise threats reaching industrial-sector organizations

During the reporting window, Trellix telemetry recorded 29.8M malicious-file detections at organizations across nine industrial-sector categories.

The volume concentrates heavily in manufacturing-aligned industries. Manufacturing alone accounts for 49.3% of the selected detection volume, followed by industrial (13.0%) and energy/oil and gas (12.3%); construction (8.0%), automotive (5.1%), transportation and shipping (3.7%), aerospace and defense (3.7%), utilities (3.6%), and process manufacturing (1.3%) make up the remainder (Figure 1). A high detection share in a sector reflects security-product activity at companies in that industry, not control-system compromise.

Industrial-sector malicious-file detections

Source: Trellix Telemetry

Industrial ransomware: Leak-site extortion claims

Across five core industrial sectors (manufacturing; construction; transportation and warehousing; mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction; utilities), Trellix ransomware tracking recorded roughly 1.5K leak-site posts, up +50.8% quarter-over-quarter (Figure 2). Manufacturing accounts for about two-thirds of this population; utilities—the most OT-salient sector—for under 2%. The increase is in posting volume; it may reflect, at least in part, posting cadence and a shifting group landscape (new and newly scaled groups appeared during the window) rather than a demonstrated rise in intrusions. The records carry no post-incident operational detail, so the absence of reported disruption is not evidence that none occurred.

Industrial ransomware leak-site claims, by month

Source: Trellix Telemetry

What Trellix SecondSight threat hunting adds

A third, independent view comes from Trellix SecondSight, our threat-hunting service, whose analyst-reviewed notifications to customers offer a small, qualitative complement to the automated telemetry above—not a second volume metric, and not combined with it. Across the period, these notifications spanned ten OT-relevant industrial sectors, echoing the broader pattern: Manufacturing led (~30%), followed by food/agriculture, transportation and shipping, and industrial. Most originated from endpoint (EDR) telemetry (~81%), with the remainder from email and Trellix Helix.

What is useful here is not the count but the character of the threats reaching these organizations. Classified from the notifications, the most common themes were phishing and malicious attachments, remote access trojans (RATs), information stealers, and PowerShell/living-off-the-land activity—with RATs the single most common primary category. Several of these are commonly associated with the initial-access, remote-control, and credential-theft stages of an intrusion; their prevalence at industrial-sector organizations is a reminder of why the IT/OT boundary matters.

Threat actor activity and major campaigns

Water-sector control-system activity—three distinct reporting streams

The clearest direct-OT signal of the period came from U.S. water and wastewater reporting. Three official streams overlap in time (late July 2026) and sector but are not established by their sources as the same operation, the same actor, or additive victim counts, and we do not present them as such.

  • Iranian-affiliated PLC targeting. CISA and partner agencies first disclosed, on April 7, 2026, in joint advisory AA26-097A, that Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat actors, “Cyber Av3ngers,” were exploiting internet-facing Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley PLCs (CompactLogix and Micro850) using legitimate engineering software (Studio 5000 Logix Designer) over leased overseas infrastructure, targeting management ports (44818, 2222, 102, 22, 502) and deploying Dropbear SSH—activity identified "since at least March 2026" and resulting in "operational disruption and financial loss in some cases." A July 22, 2026, CISA update extended this reporting into the window and expanded the observed manufacturer scope to include Schneider Electric and Siemens devices, adding detection guidance for malicious changes in reusable code modules in Rockwell PLC programs.
  • Minnesota community water systems. On July 28 and 30, 2026, Minnesota IT Services reported a coordinated cyberattack affecting more than 30 Minnesota community water systems, stating that "most confirmed cases involved technology that water systems use to remotely monitor and control equipment … programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and the … human-machine interfaces (HMIs)." Minnesota emphasized that "'impacted … does not mean every affected community experienced a disruption to water service" and that it "is not attributing this activity to a specific actor at this time."
  • Multistate internet-facing PLC targeting. A July 30, 2026, FBI/EPA alert describes attacks reported since July 27 across at least seven states, targeting internet-facing Rockwell MicroLogix 1100/1400 PLCs. Documented activity includes unauthorized changes to device IP addresses and passwords and operational effects such as pressure loss and flooding, with no specific actor attribution.

The three streams are consistent with a broader pattern of internet-exposed water-sector PLC/HMI exposure in mid-2026.

A documented destructive-OT incident

Incident-response firm Profero reported that, in May 2026, it investigated a dual IT/OT sabotage operation at an Israeli food-production plant. According to Profero, the attackers reprogrammed industrial refrigeration controllers (altering setpoints and safety limits), forced motorized valves to manual and pinned them open, wiped controller configurations, changed engineer credentials to lock out operators, and destroyed three compressors, forcing a multiday recovery. A Go-based toolkit ("GRAT") was used, and an IT-side disk-wiper component was staged but not executed.

Profero attributes the operation with high confidence to Cyber Isnaad Front, an Iranian state-directed persona associated with Aria Sepehr Ayandehsazan (ASA). This account is Profero's alone—not independently corroborated by Trellix telemetry or a second source—and the initial-access method and IT-to-OT movement path are not documented; we do not infer them. It is an important example of hands-on OT sabotage outside the energy/grid context, and one documented destructive-OT incident of the period, not necessarily the only one.

Ransomware and criminal extortion actors

In the five-sector industrial leak-site population, the two most active groups—"The Gentlemen" and Qilin—each accounted for about 16% of posts, well ahead of LockBit5 (~6%), DragonForce (~4%), and Clop (~3%). Claim volume reflects posting behavior, not severity: "The Gentlemen," the top poster, is characterized by high-volume, templated victim listings.

One methodologically notable case is the Indonesian state energy company Pertamina, claimed by two different groups three months apart (The Gentlemen, July 31; RansomHouse, September 17)—the dataset cannot distinguish one double-claimed intrusion from two separate events. Separately, government advisories documented criminal ransomware with industrial-sector victims but no OT-specific tooling: the Gunra ransomware-as-a-service operation (CISA/FBI AA26-222A), exploiting FortiOS vulnerabilities for corporate-IT access; and Cl0p/TA505, exploiting a PTC Windchill/FlexPLM zero-day (CVE-2026-12569) to steal engineering/product-lifecycle data—adjacent to industrial design workflows but not control networks.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPS)

Threat activity affecting industrial organizations during April–September 2026 highlighted the intersection of conventional enterprise cyber threats and attacks targeting industrial control systems. Trellix threat intelligence and Trellix SecondSight notifications identified phishing, malicious scripting, remote-access malware, and credential-related threats, while government advisories and incident-response investigations documented direct manipulation of PLCs, industrial configurations, and physical processes.

The following MITRE ATT&CK mapping illustrates these complementary threat patterns, distinguishing enterprise-facing techniques associated with Trellix intelligence from control-system behaviors documented in reported OT incidents.

TTP MITRE ID Context

Enterprise—Phishing

T1566

Most common Trellix telemetry observed theme: phishing and malicious attachments

Enterprise—User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste (ClickFix)

T1204.004

ClickFix/fake-CAPTCHA copy-paste lures seen in Trellix telemetry

Enterprise—PowerShell

T1059.001

PowerShell/living-off-the-land was a recurring theme in Trellix telemetry

Enterprise—Exploit Public-facing Application

T1190

Trellix threat intelligence associates exploitation of internet-facing applications and appliances with industrial-sector activity; corroborated by confirmed enterprise-edge exploitation this period

ICS—Manipulation of View

T0832

Iranian-affiliated actors manipulated data shown on HMI and SCADA displays.

ICS—Modify Parameter/Modify Alarm Settings

T0836 / T0838

Attackers altered refrigeration-controller setpoints and safety limits (Israeli food-production incident).

ICS—Change Credential

T0892

Engineer credentials changed to lock operators out. Unauthorized changes to device passwords on internet-facing PLCs.

ICS—Manipulation of Control

T0831

Motorized valves forced to manual and pinned open.
Unauthorized PLC changes with operational effects including pressure loss and flooding.

ICS—Loss of View / Loss of Control

T0829 / T0827

Operators locked out of controllers; multiday, hands-on manual recovery required.

ICS—Damage to Property

T0879

Three compressors destroyed, with multiday recovery.

Enterprise mappings are Trellix threat-intelligence associations, not verified technique execution; ICS mappings are behaviors documented in external incident reporting.

Vulnerability and exposure insights

The period's vulnerability picture divides cleanly into three bands: native OT/ICS disclosures, enterprise-edge technologies under active exploitation, and the architectural IT/OT-boundary risk those edge technologies create. We keep distinct disclosed, confirmed-exploited; verified operational consequence; and potential operational consequence.

Native OT/ICS vulnerability disclosures

Two OT vendor/CISA disclosures in September 2026 were tracked, neither with observed in-the-wild exploitation:

AVEVA Pipeline Integrity Monitor—CVE-2026-81821 (PIMBoards component), CVSS v4.0 8.3: Disclosed September 8, 2026 (AVEVA-2026-006), this documented weakness lets an attacker with read access to PIMBoards project files potentially decrypt sensitive information.

  • OT Risk Connection (potential): On a Level-3 pipeline-integrity monitoring application, this is a confidentiality/data-exposure risk—not remote network-only exploitation and not the ability to forge integrity data.
  • Disclosure-only; no in-the-wild exploitation reported.

Schneider Electric SCADAPack x70 RTU—CVE-2026-81861: Insufficiently protected credentials (CWE-522) that could expose authentication information and allow unauthorized access to RTU functionality; CVSS v3.1 6.5. Schneider published SEVD-2026-251-03 on September 8, 2026; CISA issued the corresponding advisory ICSA-26-258-04 on September 15, 2026.

  • OT Risk Connection (potential): On a field RTU, this could permit unauthorized reconfiguration by an attacker with a network path and the exposed credentials.
  • Disclosure-only; no in-the-wild exploitation reported (the advisory emphasizes RBAC, segmentation, and RTU-firewall mitigations).

Enterprise-edge technologies under active exploitation

Confirmed exploitation in-period involved enterprise-facing appliances that industrial organizations also deploy for remote access and perimeter defense:

  • Check Point Remote Access VPN—CVE-2026-50751: An IKEv1 authentication bypass (CVSS 9.3, Check Point), confirmed exploited since May 7, 2026, against "a few dozen organizations," with a documented post-compromise case involving a Qilin affiliate (Check Point advisory, June 8, 2026).
  • Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway—CVE-2026-88771/CVE-2026-88772: Critical zero-day RCE flaws added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 27, 2026, with CISA stating threat actors are "actively exploiting these vulnerabilities globally."
  • Cisco Identity Services Engine—CVE-2026-76460: An API authentication bypass (CVSS v3.1 10.0) that Cisco PSIRT states is under active exploitation (advisory September 16, 2026). This is vendor-confirmed exploitation; it is not listed in CISA's KEV catalog as of this writing—we do not equate the two.
  • Ivanti Connect Secure—CVE-2025-0282/CVE-2025-22457 (prior-period disclosures), with Ivanti-specific malware (the SPAWN family: SPAWNMOLE/SPAWNSNAIL/DRYHOOK) observed in Trellix telemetry during the window.

From enterprise edge to the IT/OT boundary—risk vs. evidence

Enterprise VPNs, application-delivery controllers, and identity systems frequently support remote access to industrial environments, making them important points of exposure at the IT/OT boundary. The confirmed exploitations described in this section primarily involved enterprise-facing systems, but these technologies can also provide pathways toward operational networks. Organizations should prioritize securing remote access, enforcing segmentation, and monitoring suspicious activity across IT and OT environments.

Historical lessons applied to modern defense

Water-sector PLC exposure is a recurring, learnable pattern. The 2026 water-sector reporting echoes the 2023–2024 campaign in which Iran-linked actors exploited internet-exposed Unitronics PLCs across U.S. water utilities using default or weak access—defacing HMIs and altering controller logic. The mechanism then and now is the same: controllers reachable from the public internet via standard engineering access, compromised without a software vulnerability.

  • Modern Application: the defensive imperative has not changed but has become more urgent—remove PLCs from direct internet exposure, gate engineering-access ports behind VPN/zero-trust access, and monitor for unauthorized configuration and logic changes. The 2026 CISA, Minnesota, and FBI/EPA reporting shows the exposure is still widespread and still being exploited.

Treat industrial ransomware as a business-continuity risk. The period's leak-site data shows a high volume of extortion claims but carries no post-incident operational detail, so it cannot tell us where the harm landed—on business systems, on operations, or not at all. Rather than infer a typical location or impact from records that lack it, the durable planning lesson is that a ransomware event at an industrial operator can threaten business continuity, and interdependencies between IT and operations can force a precautionary operational pause even when control systems are never touched. A 2025 retrospective example—the Blue Locker ransomware incident at Pakistan Petroleum, an IT-only server-encryption event that halted financial operations for roughly two days—illustrates that IT/operations coupling; it predates this reporting window and is included only as a dated reference.

  • Modern Application: Plan OT resilience around the assumption that an IT-side ransomware event may force a controlled shutdown—rehearse islanding and manual operation, and keep offline, tested backups of controller logic and HMI configurations.

Capability is outpacing demonstrated impact. Several 2026-reported items were capability or attempted activity, not incidents: The ZionSiphon water-targeting malware sample was non-functional (a bug in its own targeting logic); a "Lotus Wiper" sample aimed at the energy-sector naming convention was analyzed with no confirmed deployment; and an AI-assisted reconnaissance effort against a Mexican water utility (late 2025–early 2026) reached but failed to breach an ICS-monitoring interface.

  • Modern Application: Treat these as early-warning signals—the development pipeline for OT-capable tooling and AI-accelerated reconnaissance is active—while being careful, in reporting and in risk assessment, to distinguish a capability or a failed attempt from a realized consequence.

Defensive posture and best practices

Each recommendation below follows from a specific finding in this report.

  • Remove PLCs and HMIs from direct internet exposure; gate engineering access. The water-sector reporting shows internet-facing controllers compromised via standard engineering ports and legitimate engineering software—no vulnerability required. Inventory internet-reachable OT assets, close or VPN/zero-trust-gate engineering ports (e.g., 44818, 2222, 102, 22, 502), and alarm on unauthorized configuration or logic changes, consistent with ISA/IEC 62443 zoning.
  • Treat enterprise-edge appliances as a priority OT-adjacent attack surface. The period's confirmed exploitation was on VPNs, application-delivery controllers, and identity systems. Rapidly remediate KEV-listed edge vulnerabilities (e.g., the Citrix NetScaler flaws added to KEV on 2026-09-27), enforce phishing-resistant MFA and privileged-access management on all remote access into OT, and segment these appliances from control networks so an IT-side compromise cannot traverse unchecked.
  • Strengthen integrated IT/OT threat monitoring. Combine OT-aware network monitoring, endpoint security telemetry, and security operations capabilities to identify suspicious activity across IT and OT environments. Prioritize detection of unauthorized controller changes, anomalous industrial-protocol activity, and suspicious access across network boundaries.
  • Plan for ransomware as a business-continuity event. Because IT and operations are interdependent, an IT-side ransomware event can force a precautionary operational pause even without control-system involvement. Rehearse islanding and manual operation, and maintain offline, tested backups of PLC/RTU logic, HMI configurations, and historian data.
  • Build OT-specific destructive-event response. The Profero incident shows controller reconfiguration, lockout, and equipment destruction are realistic. Maintain controller-configuration backups and recovery procedures even in "soft" sectors such as food manufacturing, and exercise response to simultaneous IT and OT impact.
  • Apply risk-based vulnerability management to native OT disclosures. For disclosure-only OT flaws that cannot be patched quickly, apply compensating network controls around the affected Level-3 applications and RTUs and monitor for the specific weaknesses disclosed.

Conclusion

The April–September 2026 period draws a sharp line between what was confirmed and where it was confirmed. The strongest OT evidence—government-attributed and incident-response-documented activity against water-sector PLCs and against an Israeli food-production plant—came from external primary sources, and even there the reporting is careful: Operational consequences are real but scoped ("in some cases;" "not every affected community"), attribution is mixed, and distinct reporting streams should not be collapsed into one campaign. 

Trellix threat intelligence provides a complementary perspective on enterprise-facing threats affecting industrial organizations, including malicious-file detections, ransomware extortion activity, and vulnerabilities in technologies supporting remote access to industrial environments.

Together, these findings reinforce two immediate priorities: eliminating unnecessary internet exposure from industrial controllers and securing the enterprise infrastructure that provides access to OT environments. Strong segmentation, integrated IT/OT monitoring, and tested recovery procedures remain essential to reducing the risk of operational disruption.

Trellix telemetry and ransomware tracking and Trellix SecondSight findings are proprietary; exact figures, methodology, and source validation are held internally.

This document and the information contained herein describe computer security research for educational purposes only and the convenience of Trellix customers. Trellix conducts research in accordance with its Vulnerability Reasonable Disclosure Policy I Trellix. Any attempt to recreate part or all of the activities described is solely at the user’s risk, and neither Trellix nor its affiliates will bear any responsibility or liability.

Trellix is a trademark or registered trademark of Musarubra US LLC or its affiliates in the US and other countries. Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.